U.S. analysts predict that by 2025 China will be the world’s second most influential country in international politics, closely following the United States. Russia will remain sixth as it is now, they say. So how does this forecast affect our attitude toward China? Should it be viewed as a geopolitical threat or as our key ally? Vladislav Inozemtsev, Ph.D (Economics), head of the Center for Postindustrial Studies, a Moscow-based think tank, shares his thoughts on the issue with Yevgeny Shestakov, the host of Discussion Club (a joint project between RG and the Valdai Club).
Yevgeny Shestakov: American analysts have calculated that in terms of its influence on global politics China will be just 2% behind the United States by 2025, while Russia will remain in sixth place, where it is now, or fall even lower. In this situation, should Russia be building closer and friendlier relations with China? It is possible to have a friendship of equals at all?
Vladislav Inozemtsev: My opinion is that it’s hard to be friends with major powers like China or the United States, for two reasons. The first reason is the size of their economies and their ambitious political interests. The second reason involves their historic and cultural traditions. If we look at either of these two countries’ history, we will find no trend or tradition of forming parity alliances.
The United States has always had numerous satellites. American history books interpret the country’s relations with Europe as assistance to weaker partners. The United States have never shown any interest in alliances unless the potential ally was important in some way.
China’s situation is even more complex. I could not name even one known ally of that country in its entire history. China’s story is that of a lonely superpower. China has never had allies, in good times or bad times. That is why your question is so difficult to answer. Russia is unlikely to ever become a true ally for Beijing or Washington. It isn’t a question of what we want; when we discuss that, we never ask ourselves whether the other party would like to be our ally.
In my opinion, neither the United States nor China really wants an equal partnership with Russia. Oh yes, they would gladly accept Russia as a satellite; a resource supplier, no problem; a lower level geopolitical player, maybe. My instincts tell me those countries have no intention of building an equal partnership with Russia.
Shestakov: But will Russia still be able to pursue an independent foreign policy after 2025, when there will be at least two superpowers instead of one? Or will Russia have to be guided by some stronger nation?
Inozemtsev: Until recently, Russia’s foreign policy was largely based on a presumption that Russia is an independent power. You are in fact asking which country Russia would like to side with 15 years from now. This implies an understanding that Russia must choose a strong partner to rely on. This is an important sign. Until recently, we have always been discussing who is on Russia’s side. Take Ukraine for instance - is Ukraine with us or against us? And how about Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are they still with us, or are they with China or the United States? We adjusted the rules of the game depending on answers to these questions.
But you are asking which country Russia itself would like to side with, and this is an important point to make. My opinion is that at present Russia should not side with either of the two superpowers. It would be wiser, I believe, to team up with Europe, a region which has no centralized power. It would be easier for Russia to build relations with a "dispersed” superpower, one that is not too self-assured, rather than with those who are overconfident and do not need Russia much as a partner.
Shestakov: How justified is the point of view that China poses a threat to Russia, considering that its population is ten times greater?
Inozemtsev: China poses as big a threat as we allow it to. There are no hordes of immigrants crossing over from China into Russia, or into Vietnam or India, for that matter. The Chinese are "infiltrating” other countries in a different way. They arrive and start businesses, something they always do tenaciously and professionally. Their working efficiency and dedication are legendary. Moreover, the nation itself must take full credit for that, as its success was not due to abundant mineral resources or a favorable market situation. It was their own success.
For Russia, it is a question of whether or not we let them in; whether we encourage their business immigration or not. That is Russia’s problem.
It would be wrong to believe that the Chinese are invading our lands and we cannot block them. If we do not want them to settle in Russia’s Far East, they won’t be able to. The problem is rooted in fake work permits, and visas obtained in return for bribes. I do not think China poses any real geopolitical danger to Russia. There is another danger, though: China’s economy is growing rapidly and the country is expanding its industrial niche on the international markets. This may with time limit Russia’s chances of growing into an industrial economy. China is gaining a firm foothold on the international markets, thus closing the markets to our products.
Russia and China are rivals because, while Russia is mainly exporting resources now, it could and should manufacture industrial products from these resources. In my opinion, Russia’s next step along the modernization road should be transition from the resource-based economy to an industrial economy. Further steps would be a post-industrial economy, and then a research-intensive and innovation-based economy, some fifty years from now. This means Russia will claim the niche currently occupied by China, which will not give it up without a fight.
In this sense, China is a barrier to Russia’s modernization, but not a threat - not a potential military aggressor or anything like that.
Shestakov: Rossiyskaya Gazeta has conducted an online survey in which about half of respondents said China was an economic and a demographic threat to Russia.
Inozemtsev: Let me repeat: China is Russia’s industrial rival. Most Russian-Chinese economic agreements involve Russian commodity supplies to China. Most of our cooperation programs envisage upstream projects in Russia and downstream operations in China.
Shestakov: But these projects help us diversify our markets and stimulate the development of Russia’s Far East.
Inozemtsev: Alright, we could also employ Chinese workers or sell technology to that country. But my point is that we must participate as equal partners in both mineral production and refining projects. Right now, there is no denying that Russia is Europe’s resource base, supplying nearly 100% of its natural gas and 70% of its crude oil to Europe. But we also risk becoming a resource supplier for China, which is itself an industrial appendix of the United States and Europe.
As for the potential "demographic infiltration,” I do not believe it is dangerous. One should always bear in mind that any country, and certainly Russia, has every right and opportunity to regulate immigration. Russia’s immigration policy is not very effective at the moment, but it is a matter of experience and professionalism. Russia can and must check the flow of immigrants in its Far East, but is failing to do so. That is Russia’s problem.
Shestakov: Chinese nationalists believe Russia’s Far East to be part of the Great Chinese Empire.
Inozemtsev: The idea that all the bilateral agreements, including those signed between the pre-1917 Russia and China, between the Soviet Union and China, as well as the latest Russian-Chinese agreements, are unfair, is quite popular in Chinese society; this perspective is reflected in most materials used to educate Chinese military and in publications by leading Chinese military theorists.
The Chinese media certainly share this view. China has certain territorial claims to Russia. However, although the country may have some claims, it is absolutely unlikely to start an open conflict. Japan has territorial claims too but Russian politicians and political analysts cannot imagine Japan attacking Russia to resolve the Kurils issue. This is simply impossible.
China is a country that will be too busy with its economic growth during the next few years. It does not need any shocks for another decade or two. Beijing’s only major problem, Taiwan, will be enough to keep it on its toes.
From all of the above, I do not think Russia should expect a Chinese aggression. However, we should have a clear understanding that China does not really see Russia as a friend. When I last visited China in April, I heard one Chinese official make a very clear and frank statement. He said all disagreements between Russia and China stem from the same root: if Russia agreed to be China’s junior partner, many tensions could be avoided. That is, if only Russia consented to become a junior partner and follow China’s lead on most international issues, our relations would immediately become ideal. This is an almost literal translation of what that young foreign ministry official said.
Let me emphasize that China is not a military threat to Russia, but it can be a threat in the sense that it will not live up to Russia’s illusory hopes. What we need is a more realistic approach to this potential great partner; we must understand its interests and our opportunities, and build positive relations without having to cede positions.
Russia should not rush from one extreme toward the other - from preparing for war to undying love and best friends forever. What is important is that Russia and China are neighbors that have broad cross-border economic interaction, as well as tangled crucial interests in Central Asia.
Many nations are afraid of China; we aren’t because we shouldn’t be. What we need to do is seek common ground and ways to cooperate. We also should be optimistic about our relations. On the other hand, both countries must try to avoid disappointment. If we invent a nice story about China being Russia’s best friend or worshipping Russia, the subsequent disillusionment may be frustrating and may provoke a disproportionate reaction. The same may happen to China if Russia agrees with its leadership now and then, ten years later, turns its back on China and sides with Europe or America.
Therefore, we should avoid having illusions or making infeasible commitments. We should avoid false hopes, because disappointment may strain relations, which is the last thing Russia or China needs.
I am afraid that Russia is exaggerating its ability to pressure China. The country is manufacturing Russian weapons and will soon enter the international space launch market. China is growing to become East Asia’s top civil aircraft manufacturer. Russia’s plans to sell technology to China are another illusion. The United States exports lots of technology patents, licenses and rights. But pure technology accounts for a mere 4% of U.S. exports. The rest is technology materialized in industrial products, such as Boeing aircraft, Ford cars, Nike sneakers, Microsoft software, etc. That is not bare technology.
While planning to sell technology, Russia must realize that it will never replace its oil and gas revenues. But, if we use that technology to manufacture industrial products we’ll have to deal with strong competition from China.
Shestakov: Russian analysts often discuss China’s economic, social and political models. Could any of them be useful for Russia?
Inozemtsev: I do not see any useful experience with social issues that we could borrow from China. In the economy, I believe we could pick up some useful tips, primarily a clear understanding that there is no need to reinvent the wheel. That is exactly what we are doing now in most technology projects. We say we need to invest billions of dollars in R&D forgetting that we are spending taxpayers’ money on something already obsolete.
China takes a different approach. If there is no chance of back-engineering and replicating the best Western models, China encourages foreign companies to establish operations there and tries to learn from them over a few years. At the same time local companies open similar operations where local engineers, technologists and innovators could learn. We should use this scheme as a model. We should not spend federal funds to do something that is already done. We should quickly borrow technology from other countries and use it to build Russian R&D projects.
In politics, China’s wise human resources policies are certainly worth looking up to. It is wrong to believe China is not a democracy. The country has developed a good scheme to rotate important personnel. If we look at the current list of China’s Political Bureau members and major regional leaders, we’ll see that only one-third of the people on it were on the list, say, in 2002. The Chinese have invented a system for controlled renewal of government, which limits high-ranking officials to two terms in office and includes regular replacements and competitive promotion. This is something Russia needs to learn. China is not a Western-style democracy. Maybe Russia doesn’t need to be one either. But China’s system requires officials to bear responsibility for failure to fulfill their duties (not necessarily for misappropriation of funds, but also for inefficiency). There is healthy competition, which encourages renewal of strategies.
The Chinese have in fact achieved an impossible combination: having all the benefits of democracy without democracy. China is a regulated democracy. The system takes into account a candidate’s abilities and competencies, and even public opinion to some extent.
Shestakov: There is an ongoing discussion in Russia of which civilization our country really belongs to. Do you think it is closer to Europe or to Asia?
Inozemtsev: If we take the Chinese culture and the English culture, for example, I believe that Russia is close to neither. Russia is a separate civilization with centuries of experience accumulated independently during some periods and influenced by European culture during others. However, Russia has never been influenced by China. In any case, Russia is a unique case.
Therefore, the question is which elements of culture Russians feel that they share. To answer this question, we need to identify ten most characteristic features of the Chinese culture and ten features of the European culture, and ask Russians which of these things are part of the Russian culture as they see it. If they choose nine items from the Chinese list and one from Europe, it means Russians identify themselves with Asian culture. If they pick nine European items and one Chinese, or seven European and no Chinese, it means the situation is different.
I have never heard of a well-structured survey in Russia on this issue. What I saw was most likely sponsored by someone and the results were adjusted to fit the desired conclusion, depending on who had financed the poll.
I believe a serious social research project could produce very interesting results which I cannot predict. Personally I would prefer the "European” answer, but I am not sure it will be the case. Still, it would be wise to find out Russia’s historic self-identification.